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justice 
journals have published material on gender 
issues, the gender division of labor, discrimina-
tion, and segmented markets. RRPE, for 
instance, has published five special issues on 
the political economy of women. A major 
development in political economy is the recent 
emergence of Feminist Economics in 1995, 
which attempts a holistic analysis of gender, 
culture, sexuality, households, methodology 
and many other issues. The continuing im-
portance of workplace democracy, the labor 
process, and power and inequality relations has 
led to the introduction of Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Labour and Industry, 
Work, Employment and Society, Prometheus 
and Gender, Work and Organization. 
International political economy. A critical 
area of political economy has always been the 
world stage. Apart from the Review, mentioned 
above, in 1994 the Review of International 
Political Economy emerged. It has already 
examined some critical questions, such as 
global hegemony, core-periphery relations, 
world-systems analysis and related themes. 
For decades global political economy issues 
have been discussed in journals that are stacked 
in the political science section of the library, 
such as International Organization, the Inter-
national Studies Quarterly and the Review of 
International Studies. The Journal of World-
System Research, which emerged in 1995, is the 
first electronic journal in political economy. 
Other journals in political economy 
International Papers in Political Economy, 
edited by Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, 
first appeared in 1993; its first issue was a 
brilliant analysis of the linkages within modern 
political economy. Of popular interest are 
Challenge and Dollars and Sense. Well worth 
a good look are Kyklos, the Review of Austrian 
Economics, Eastern Economic Journal, Review 
of Income and Wealth, Review of World 
Economics, Economy and Society, Growth and 
Change, New Political Economy, Cultural 
Economics, Competition and Change plus the 
numerous economic history and urban and 
regional journals. Also, many sociology, poli-
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tics, ecology, philosophy, culture critique and 
business journals regularly have articles which 
impact on political economy. (A neoclassical or 
'Austrian' influence is predominant in Econom_ 
ics and Politics, the European Journal of 
Political Economy and the Journal of Institu_ 
tional and Theoretical Economics.) 
Conclusion 
Geoffrey Hodgson has examined indices of 
citations to heterodox journals and found some 
of them to be among the most cited journals in 
the world (notably the Journal of Economic 
Issues, and the Cambridge Journal of Econom-
ics). Also, the large rang~ and breadth of 
modern political economy journals illustrates 
that political economy is in a healthy state. An 
increasing trend in these journals is for 
dialogue among different schools of thought, 
such as post-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, institu-
tionalist, feminist , Sraffian, social and Schum-
peterian political economy. Students choosing 
political economy as a career will find many 
outlets for serious research in an increasing 
number of journals. So extensive has this outlet 
become that the periodical Review of Hetero-
dox Economics was established in 1995 by Eric 
Nilsson to document recent contents pages of 
many of these journals, working papers and the 
like. 
See also: 
political economy: major contemporary 
themes; political economy: schools 
PHILLIP ANTHONY O'HARA 
justice 
Justice is generally agreed to be about treating 
equals equally and unequals according to their 
relevant inequalities, and is thus closely asso-
ciated with fairness. Justice has a variety of 
senses, two of which need to be distinguished to 
understand thinking about justice in 
economics. Commutative justice concerns 
whether exchange is fair, such as in connection 
with the payment of wages and the setting of 
prices. Distributive justice concerns whether 
there is a fair distribution of resources, of 
society's benefits and burdens, and of such 
things as income, jobs, goods, property, taxa-
tion and social services. Both senses of justice 
are important in economics, but distributive 
justice has historically received more attention, 
since for many whether contracts are fair and 
just is often believed to depend upon whether 
resources are justly distributed. For example, it 
may be thought fair to pay one person a higher 
wage than another (based on skill differences) 
if the latter person, having greater needs, is still 
left with a higher after-tax income. 
Distributive justice and heterodoxy 
Debates regarding distributive justice revolve 
around different schools advocating different 
criteria for a just distribution of resources. 
With a few exceptions, however, these debates 
in the last half-century have only involved 
heterodox economists, since mainstream econ-
omists have generally ignored issues of dis-
tributive justice and restricted their normative 
interests to Pareto efficiency judgments. Why 
this is the case helps explain why heterodox 
economists are interested in distributive justice. 
Standard neoclassical models treat individuals' 
endowments as exogenous, and also assume 
that markets are generally competitive. 
In contrast, heterodox economists endogen-
ize endowments, that is, understand them to be 
determined by market forces and the economic 
process, and see market power as the rule 
rather than the exception. Distributive justice is 
thus central to heterodox economists' concerns, 
because understanding how societies settle on 
"fair" distributions of resources is inseparable 
from understanding how their economies 
operate. It is also central to heterodox con-
cerns, because understanding the connection 
between the distribution of resources and the 
operation of the economy imparts an under-
standing of opportunities for social reform, a 
concern shared by many heterodox economists. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given their differ-
justice 
ent theoretical approaches, heterodox econo-
mists emphasize different traditions with 
competing criteria to explain the just distribu-
tion of resources. Chief among these traditions 
are the Marxian view of distribution according 
to need, the utilititarian view of distribution 
according to what maximizes utility, the 
libertarian view that emphasizes freedom, and 
the Rawlsian social contract view. All have 
supporters among heterodox economists, and 
elements of each often find their way into the 
views of many. 
Marxian view 
The Marxian view is premised on a critique of 
capitalist society as being based on class 
EXPLOITATION of workers by capitalists. The 
capitalist system of justice is part of bourgeois 
society's legal and ideological requirements for 
capitalist production, one of the most impor-
tant of which is the defense of private property 
in the means of production. For Marx, class 
oppression does not constitute a legitimate or 
ultimately historically viable basis for a just 
society, which he believed would only come 
about with the revolutionary appearance of 
communist society (Marx 1867). In such a 
society, resources would be distributed accord-
ing to need, where generally need was a matter 
of human development (see SOCIALISM AND 
COMMUNISM). This general criterion, however, 
has also been defended by a variety of non-
Marxists (e.g. Braybrooke 1987), with the 
debate over what needs individuals possess 
further differentiating competing views of what 
distributive justice requires. Indeed, for most 
heterodox economists, a just distribution of 
resources depends at least in part on addressing 
individual and social NEEDS. 
Utilitarian theory 
The utilitarian theory of just distribution is 
best formulated in terms of rule rather than act 
utilitarianism, the former being the idea that 
we do not judge every single action by the 
standard of whether it contributes to the 
greatest utility, but rather according to society's 
597 
justice 
rules and practices on this basis (Brandt 1959). 
On this view, social rules are preferred that 
raise overall utility, irrespective, in principle, of 
its distribution. In practice, however, the 
classical utilitarians, including Jeremy Ben-
tham, IS. Mill and Henry Sidgwick, believed 
that utility is increased by having more equal 
distributions of resources. Earlier neoclassical 
economists thus used the principle of diminish-
ing marginal utility and the concept of inter-
personal comparisons of utility to argue that 
overall utility would be enhanced if goods and! 
or income were transferred from well-off 
individuals, for whom this would involve a 
modest loss of utility, to less well-off indivi-
duals, for whom this would involve a signifi-
cant increase in utility. In the limit this implied 
that an equal DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
produces maximum utility (Pigou 1920), an 
egalitarian conclusion reinforced by the 
assumption that every person's utility counts 
equally. 
After Lionel Robbins, however, the fact that 
nothing in utilitarianism in principle required 
any assumptions regarding distribution en-
abled neoclassical economists to abandon 
interpersonal utility comparisons and distribu-
tive justice concerns. This has not prevented 
many heterodox economists from arguing that 
a more equal distribution of resources is just, 
because it increases the greater good. 
libertarian thinking 
Libertarian thinking about justice has been 
most recently associated with the views of 
Robert Nozick (1974). Following such thinkers 
as Friedrich von Hayek, Nozick's entitlement 
theory of justice regards economic outcomes as 
just if they arise from acquisitions of what was 
unowned or what was voluntarily transferred. 
Just acquisitions are those that neither violate 
others' rights nor their individual freedoms. 
This implies that the redistribution of wealth 
and income is only justified when it remedies 
previous violations of rights or freedom. Such 
a view naturally places heavy weight on the 
theory of rights and freedom, which for Nozick 
and most neo-Austrian economists are taken 
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prima facie as status quo rights and freedoms 
associated with existing property arrangements. 
However, it can be argued that many current 
property rights are the product of forcible 
property expropriations in the past, and con-
sequently that redistribution of property is 
often just on libertarian grounds. Moreover, 
while libertarians generally understand free-
dom in a negative sense, that is, as non-
interference, a positive conception of freedom 
involving capacities to act would permit an 
even more flexible view of just redistribution. 
Rawls's social contract 
John Rawls's social contract_view in A Theory 
of Justice (1971) develops two principles of 
justice that he argues rational individuals 
would agree to behind a hypothetical "veil of 
ignorance" regarding what positions they 
might occupy in society. The first of these, 
based on the idea that individuals would seek 
to safeguard their basic political liberties, is 
that "each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others" (Rawls 1971: 
60). The second is that society's social and 
economic institutions may allow economic 
inequalities only to the extent that they tend 
to promote the "greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged," and are "attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity" (Rawls 1971: 83). 
Well-being and benefit are measured not in 
terms of preference satisfaction but rather 
"primary social goods," such things as educa-
tion or income that function as all-purpose 
resources for the variety of activities in which 
people engage. Thus Rawls's view is both 
egalitarian in its view of what a just distribu-
tion of resources involves, and yet also 
compatible with a market society in which 
individuals' transactions produce differing de-
grees of preference satisfaction. 
There are other views of distributive justice 
(for example, the institutionalist view; see Tool 
1979: 329- 36), but these four have attracted the 
most attention from heterodox economists. In 
most cases, it is probably fair to say that 
heterodox economists tend to draw on each of 
these frameworks in some degree to explain 
justice. Need, utility or the greatest good, 
rights, freedom and equality are all notions 
that have a place in a full normative frame-
work. Their integration, however, requires that 
distributive justice become a more central 
concern in economics, and that the main-
stream's single-minded focus on Pareto reason-
ing be displaced. 
See also: 
crime; ethics and morality; inequality; poverty: 
absolute and relative 
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